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governor of a state as an election officer, and to punish him through the
national courts for malfeasance and nonfeasance in office : Kentucky v.
Dennison, 23 How. 66. And especially would this seem to be so in
view of the fact that the certificate of the governor is not binding upon
Congress, each house of which is, by the Constitution, made the judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own member: Art. 1,
sect. 5.
Admitting for the occasion the power of Congress to provide for the
punishment of the executive of a state, as claimed by the prosecution
we repeat, that in view of the foregoing considerations, it seems to
be improbable that it would undertake to exercise the power. At all
events, it is impossible, on any legal principles, that any such intention
should be held to exist from the use of the general words, "election
officers."
We have carefully considered the very able arguments which have
been addressed to us to show that the governor is embraced in the more
general language of sections 19 and 20 of the same act, and that, if so
these words, supposed to include the governor, should, though omitted
by the legislature, be inserted by official engraftment into section 22, on
which the indictment is founded. In answer to the argument; we deem
it necessary only further to observe that the governor is not in terms
named in either of those sections; that it is far from certain that
they intended to embrace any official act of this officer, and if they did,
we could not after the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by
Chief Justice MARSHALL, in The United Statesv. Wiltberger, supra, enter
upon the dangerous and unauthorized work of incorporating the provi-
sions of one section of a law into another. We could never be sure that
we did not put in what Congress may have purposely left out. The
bill charges no indictable offence, and the demurrer thereto must be
sustained.
CALDWELL, District udge, concurred.
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I ADIMINISTRATION.
Payment of Claims.-Under our statute, an administrator is not
authorized to pay claims allowed until an order to that effect has been
made by the court: Dullard's Admin'r. v. -Hardy, 47 Mo.
I From James B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 33 Ind. Rep.
2 From C. C. Whittelsey, Esq., late Reporter; to appear in 47 Mo. Rep.
3 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Relporter; to appear in vol. 60 of his Reports.
4 From r. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 66 Penna. State Rep.
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CORPORATION.
Violation of (Tarer-Interest.-A corporation authorized by its
charter to take and receive a particular rate of interest upon loans and
discounts, violates its charter and may be proceeded against for a for-
feiture. if it take and receive a greater rate than that permitted by the
charter: Attorney-.Ge.neral v. Boatmen's Sav. Inst., 47 Mo.
Proptissory -Ate.-A corporation known as "The Aurora Brewing
and Malting Company" executed a note signed "0. C. Kelsey, Ass't
Sec'y Aurora Brewing and Malting Company." fIeld, that this was
the note of the corporation, and not that of C. C. Kelsey personally:
Gaff et al. v. Theis, 33 Ind.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Fraudulent Conveyance.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE.
Set-Off-Another Action Pending.-A judgment for costs against a
decedent's estate, to enforce which a suit by the judgment-plaintiff
against the administrator upon his bond is pending and undetermined,
cannot be set up as a set-off in a suit by said administrator against said
judgment-plaintiff upon a note executed by the latter to the decedent:
Nave v. Wilson, 33 Ind.
Where an account has been filed as a claim against a decedent's
estate, and final judgment on the merits of the cause has been rendered,
=uch judgment, remaining in force, is a bar against said account as a
et-off in a suit by the administrator of said estate against the claimant
upon a note executed by the latter to said decedent: Z
DEED.
DeliveU.-There can be no delivery of a deed except by the express
or presumed assent of the grantee. Although in some cases a delivery
may be presumed, yet when it is shown that the grantee expressly re-
fuses to accept, the deed does not convey the title: Rogers v. Care,
47 Mo.
ESTOPPEL,. See Insurance.
EVIDENCE.
Proof of Facts not alleyqed in the (omplaint.-Woras. used by a
vendor, during a negotiation for the sale of land, respecting the title,
and susceptible of sustaining a separate allegation of fraud in the com-
plaint, but not inserted therein, may be used as evidence to sustain the
allegations that are contained in the complaint, if employed during the
same conversation with the latter allegations and incapable of separation
from them: Upd~.ke v. Abel, 60 Barb.
FACTOR.
Bankruptc l-Discharge.-A fhctor, under the Bankruptcy Act of
1867, opeupies a fiduciary relation to his principal, and the debt due for
goods sold by the commission merchant is not releamed by the discharge
in bankruptcy: Lenke v. Booth, 47 Mo.
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FORGERY.
A party was intrusted with checks signed in blank for a particular
purpose; he struck out the words "to order," and filled up the blank,
and deposited the check to his own account in bank. Held, that he
was guilty of forgery in making a false instrument: Stlate v. Kroeger,
47 Mo.
FRAUD. See Irendor and Purchaser.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Agreement within.-The plaintiff's farm being sold on a mnortgage
foreclosure, was bid off for $2400 by W., who agreed orally with the
plaintiff to let him have the farm back on the payment of the said sum
of $2400 and the sum of $20 for expenses. The plaintiff failed to pro-
cure the money, or security, within the time limited; the time was ex-
tended, and within the extended time he procured the defendant to take
a conveyance from W., upon the terms on which W. had agreed to con-
vey to the plaintiff. And it was then agreed, by parol between the
parties, that the plaintiff should remain in possession and receive the
rents and profits, and with them and from other sources refund to the
defendant what he had paid or should pay or secure to W., and that on
such payment the defendant should convey the premises to the plaintiff.
Held, that the agreement of the defendant to convey the premises being
by parol was void by the Statute of Frauds, and could not be enforced
in equity: Loomis v. Loomis, 60 Barb.
Held, also, that the plaintiff having, at the time of making the agree-
ment, no title or interest in the premises, and there being no legal con-
sideration received from him for the promise made by the defendant,
that wasinother difficulty thrown in his way by the Statute of Frauds: Id.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
The New York Statute of Uses and Trusts only makes conveyances
fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the grantor at the time
of the conveyance: Lovemore et al. v. Campbell et al., 60 Barb.
Even though a conveyance be voluntary, it may be upheld as against
the subsequent creditors of the grantor: Id.
A finding of fact by a referee that conveyances were made with intent
to hinder, delay, and defraud the future creditors of the grantor, wheu
the whole case shows that there were then no creditors to be defrauded,
is, in law, simply absurd, or rather, a legal impossibility: Id.
GUARANTY.
Notice-Lease.-It was stipulated in a lease for two years that the
lessee should pay the lessor rent, in a certain sum for the entire period,
in two equal payments, for which the lessee agreed to give his notes
with surety to the satisfaction of the lessor. Certain third persons ex-
ecuted an agreement annexed to the lease, as follows: "We guarantee
that" the lessee "shall perform his agreements in the foregoing con-
tract." The lessee took possession, and failed to execute such notes or
pay the sum due, of which notice was given to the guarantors ten months
after the commencement af the lease. Held, that the guarantors were
not released from their liability as such as to the payment of the money,
by the neglect of the lessor to notify them at an earlier date of the
failure of the lessee to give the notes: Leonard v. Shirts, 33 Ind.
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INSURANCE.
Notice- 1Vaiver.-A condition in a fire policy was that notice of a
fire should be given to the "1secretary forthwith." The morning after
the fire, the insured and the local agent of the company, with his counsel,
visited and examined the premises; the insured was examined on oath,
his statement signed by him was sent next day by the agent to the
secretary. Held, that this was a compliance with the condition: Beatty
v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 66 Pa.
The condition required that there should be given to the secretary
within thirty days "a particular account of such loss." The notice was
a loss of "household furniture $367, groceries $233," the same as i-1
the policy. Held, that the court below properly ruled that this was not
a compliance with the condition: held, also, that the question of suffi-
ciency should not have been submitted to the jury: 1L.
To constitute waiver of notice, there should be some official act or
declaration of the company during the currency. of the time, something
from which the insured might reasonably infer that the underwriters did
not mean to insist on it. Mere silence is not enough: .d.
After the thirty days without "a particular account," nothing but an
express agreement with tie company would be sufficient: Id.
Franklin Fire Ins. Co. *v. Updegraff, 7 Wright 350, Inland Ins. Co.
v. Stauffer, 9 Casey 397, distinguished: Id.
Double hisurance- Value of Froperty-Payment into Court.-A fire
policy contained: "It is agreed, That the aggregate amount insured in
this and other companies, on the above-mentioned property; shall not
exceed two-thirds of the estimated cash value." Held, that the esti-
mated value was that at the time of insurance: Elliott v. Lycorning Ins.
Co., 66 Pa.
The value of buildings was estimated when insured at $1950, and the
amount insured $1300; additions were made; the agent of the company
certified that he had examined and the addition did not increase the
risk. $1000 more was then insured in another company; the buildings
were burned. At the time of the fire the value of the buildings was
$4200. field, that the first policy was forfeited for over insurance: Id.
If a company after notice of over -insurance makes and collects assess-
ments, they treat the contract as still subsisting and are estopped from
setting up a forfeiture: Id.
An over insurance was made and afterwards an assessment was made;
the treasurer discovering the error, notified the local agent not to collect
it; the agent forgetting his instructions demanded it, but recollecting
them, did not collect it. field, not to be a waiver by the company: .d.
Under these facts, waiver was for the court: Id.
A judge is not bound to submit a mere spark of evidence; there must
be enough to raise a reasonable question for decision: IM.
An insurance was on a house and stable in one policy; an over insur-
ance was made on the house; both were burned; the company tendered
payment for the loss on the stable. Held, not to be an affirmance of
the contract, so as to estop them from setting up a forfeiture as to the
house: Id.
Payment of money into court when the declaration is on a special
contract, admits the contract so as to supersede the necessity of prov-
ing it: Id.
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Payment of money into court is the acknowledgment of the right of
action to the amount brought in, but not beyond that: Id.
Such payment waives no defence, although the defence be to the
whole : Id.
After such payment the case goes on substantially as if the money
had not been paid in; the defendant may take a defence which goes to
the whole cause of action: Id.
JUDGMENT.
Irregularity in.-An auditor cannot declare a judgment on an amicable
scireacias void and no lien, for want of a stamp on the agreement or
for any other irregularity: Edwards's Appeal, 66 Pa.
An irregular judgment may be reversed on error, but it is good until
then. An auditor can disregard a judgment only where it is void: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Sherifs Sale.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Bonds.-The bonds issued by a municipal corporation, although not
authorized by an existing statute, become binding when the action of
the corporation is subsequently ratified by th, legislature: Steines et al.
v. Franklin County et al., 47 Mo.
NEGLIGENCE.
Burden of Proof.-In an action for negligence, if the plaintiff makes
out a prim! facie case, the burden is on the defendant to disprove care,
and thus establish negligence in the plaintiff: Pennsylvania Canal Co.
v. Bentley,, 66 Pa.
If the plaintiff's own case disclose contributory negligence he cannot
recover : Id.
It is negligence in a traveller crossing a railroad, not to stop and look
up and down, because he is bound to presume that a train may be ap-
proaching: 1d.
Where a duty is defined, a failure to perform it is negligence and
may be so declared by the court: 1d.
Where the measure of duty is not unvarying, and a higher degree is
demanded in some circumstances than in others, a jury alone can deter-
mine what is negligence and whether it has been proved: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Attornc 's.-Where attorneys as partners had recovered a judgment
for their client, and after the dissolution of the firm one of the partners
collected the debt and failed to pay it over to the principal, the other
partner is liable to an action for the money: Bryant v. Hawkins, 47 Mo.
PAYMENT INTO COURT. See Insurance.
PLEADING.
Promissory rote-Alent.-A promissory note payable to A. B.,
agent of the Enterprise Insurance Company," was executed fcr the
use of said company in consideration of a policy of insurance under-
written by it. fleld, in a suit on the note in the name of said company,
that the action was brought by the proper party: Black v. Enten, ,
Ins. Co., 33 Ind.
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An answer to a suit by an insurance company on a promissory note
executed to such company in consideration of a policy of insurance
issued by it, alleging that the plaintiff is a foreign insurance company,
and that the contract of insurance was entered into in this state through
an agent resident therein, but not also showing a non-compliance with
the requirements of the Act of December 21st 1865, regulatihg foreign
insurance companies, &c., is bad on demurrer: Id.
.Parties-Set.Off-:Promssoy Note.-Suit on a note by the payee
against the maker. Answer, that the note was given in consideration
of the sale of a certain number of sheep purchased by the defendant of
a third person named, and for no other consideration; that it was made
payable to the plaintiff at the request of said third person, who repre-
sented that he desired it made payable to the plaintiff for the purpose of
enabling him to place it in the plaintiff's hands as his agent for collec-
tion, and for -no other purpose; that at the time the note was given,
said third person was indebted to the defendant in a certain sum, of
which a bill of particulars was annexed; and the defendant offered to
set off said indebtedness against the note. Held, that the answer was
bad, for the reason that it did not allege that the plaintiff was not the
owner of the note in his own right, or that said third person had any
right thereto or beneficial interest therein: Waddle v..Harbeck, 33 Ind.
In a suit by a trustee, the defendant may set off a debt due him from
the cestui gue trust: Rd.
Suit on a note by the payee against the maker. Answer, by way of
set-off, that the plaintiff was not the owner of the note and had no in-
terest in it, but was merely the agent of a third person named, who
procured the note to be made payable to the plaintiff, to enable the
latter to collect it as such agent, and for no other reason ; that the note
was given for certain articles sold to the defendant by said third person;
that at its date said third person was indebted and still continued to be
indebted to defendant for goods sold and delivered by the latter to the
former, of which a bill of particulars was filed, amounting to a certain
sum, less than the amount of the note; that, by agreement of the
parties, said note was made payable to the plaintiff for the purpose of
enabling him to settle the same and receive from the defendant the
excess over the amount of said indebtedness which it was agreed, when
the note was made and delivered, should be applied in part payment of
the note. Held, that the answer, if true, made the plaintiff a trustee of
an express trust, under the statute, and capable of maintaining the
action in his own name: held, also, that the answer was good on de-
murrer: Id.
PRACTICE.
Objections must be made in Beason.-If there is any foundation for
the objection that a recovery has been had upon grounds not alleged in
the complaint, it should be made in season. After judgment, it is too
late for the unsuccessful party to avail himself of it: Updike v. Abel,
60 Barb.
NAw Trial for Want of -Proof.-Under the system of practice estab-
lished by the Code, in order to entitle a defendant to a new trial, on
the grotnd that the plaintiff has not proved the case made by his com-
plaint, it. must appear that the cause of action is unproved in its entire
scope: I .
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
RAIROAD. See Negligence.
Unnecessai Injury to Lands-Suit for .Damages.-The charter of a
railroad company provided, that "in all cases where the owners of land
or stone necessary for the use and construction of saia road shall refuse
to relinquish the same to the corporation, or shall refuse to accept a
fair compensation therefor, it shall be lawful for the corporation, by
their president or any superintendent, agent, or engineer employed by
them, to enter upon and take possession and use the same, avoiding in
all cases unnecessary damage or injury to the owners or proprietors;"
and the charter then provided the mode of the assessment and payment
of the damages to the landowner. Beld, that the damages to be assessed
and paid in the mode prescribed by the charter were those resulting
from a construction of the road with care, skill, and prudence, not only
as to the safety of persons and property passing over the road, but also
as to the protection and safety of the property-holder; and that if by
reason of any want of care, skill, or prudence for the protection and
safety of the landowner, his property was unnecessarily damaged in the
construction or repairing of the road, he might recover therefor in an
action for damages as at common law: Terre Haute and lndianapolis
R. R. Co. v. .McKinley, 33 Ind.
SALE.
Stoppage in transitu.-A. shipped from Chicago a quantity of wheat,
consigned, according to bill of lading in duplicate taken by him, to B.,
at Indianapolis, on account of A., who had contracted it to B., I tit it
was not to be his till paid for. A. drew at sight, on the date of the
shipment, for the price of the wheat, attaching to the draft one copy of
the bill of lading endorsed, and negotiated the draft at a Chicago bank,
which transmitted it to an Indianapolis bank for collection. During the
forenoon of the day after the shipment, while the wheat was in transit,
C. purchased the wheat of B., at Indianapolis, and paid for it, taking
from him at the time a bill of lading for the wheat, issued by a railroad
company at Indianapolis, on that day, to B., on account of C., who sup-
posed the wheat had then arrived at Indianapolis. The shipping list
had been received, but the wheat did not arrive till the night of the
following day. C. had no notice of any right of A. to the wheat. Said
draft reached Indianapolis at about the hour that B. sold the wheat to
C. An attempt was immediately made to present the draft, but B., the
drawee, who was insolvent and failed that'day, could not be found. In
the afternoon, the Indianapolis bank notified the carrier, said railroad
company, to hold the wheat for the consignor; and at a later hour on
the same day, a similar notice was given at the express instance of said
consignor, and the wheat was held accordingly. Held, in an action of
replevin by C., that he had no right to the possession of the wheat:
lPattison, v. Culton et al., 33 Ind.
SET-Orr. See Decedent's Estate.
SHERIFF'S SALE.
Execution.--Upon a venditioni exponas, the sheriff cannot levy upon
and sell lands not previously seized, and his sale will convey no title:
lfaupin et al. v. Emmons et al., 47 Mo.
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Statute of Limitations.-Land was sold by the sheriff, there being no
special terms of sale; the purchaser failed to comply ; it was again sold
for a less sum: the Statute of Limitations began to ran from the failure
to -comply and not from the second saI. : Funk v. : '1h, 66 Pa.
The legal inference of a promise to pay was from dhe bid, the failure
to pay was the breach, from which the cause of action arose, and the
difference between the sales was evidence as to the measure of dam-
ages : Id.
This was not the result of an alternative contract to pay damages in
lieu of the bid, but an election of the sheriff to put up the property
again and to sue for damages: Id.
The postponement of the second sale is the act of the sheriff or the
party who directs him, for which the bidder is not responsible: Id.
SLANDER.
Words Actionable per se-Presumptions as to Criminal Offenes.-In
slander it is not necessary that all the words, laid in the declarition
should be actionable; it is sufficient if some are: K umyh v. Dunn,
66 Pa.
All words spoken at the time may be- laid and given in evidence as
showing the animus: Id.
Where words impute that a common-law offence had been committed
in another state, it need not be affirmatively proved that the offence was
indictable there: Id.
The presumption is that the common law of a sister state is similar to
our own: Id.
That words should impute an offence for which there would be lia-
bility to prosecution or punishment, is not the criterion of their action-
able character: .d.
To render words actionable per se they must impute an offence of
moral turpitude punishable criminally: .d. I
The law as to the offence in the country in which the words are
spoken is to determine their character: 1.
Words spoken in Pennsylvania charged the commission of adultery
in Georgia. Held, that they were actionable per se : Id.
The position in life and the family of a plaintiff in slander are im-
portant circumstances as bearing on the question of damages and are
admissible; they need not be laid in the declaration: Id.
STA P. See Judgment.
SURETY.
Offlcial Bond.-Where A. was requested to become a surety on a
sheriff's official bond by B., a person having no connection with the
bond, which was not then present, and A. told B. that the latter might
sign the name of the former to the bond, provided that 0. and D. first
executed it, and, A. never having seen the bond, never having been
requested by said sheriff to execute it, and never having had any com-
munication in relation to the bond with said sheriff or any other person,
except B., the name of A. was signed by B. to the bond, which was
mever executed by C. or D.; Held, that A. was not bound as a surety:
Bagot v. State, ex rel. Dennison, 33 Ind.
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A sheriff's return to an execution, showing the collection of the money
thereon, is conclusive upon the sureties on his official bond in a suit on
such bond on the relation of the execution-plaintiff for the failure of
the officer to pay over such money: Id.
Promissory Note- Conideration.-Where a promissory note with
surety has been given upon an agreement that the payee shall deliver
up to the maker another note for the same amount theretofore executed
by the same maker with other surety to the same payee, and the payee
fails to so deliver up said other note, there is no consideration to sup-
port the new note: .eeg v. Weigand, 33 Inld.
If such new note be given to indemnify the security on the old note,
the new one becomes an additional security in the hands of the payee;
and the surety for whose indemnity it has been given, having paid the
debt and received said new note from the payee, may recover thereon.
against the new surety: Id.
TAXATION.
Collector-Suit.-Although an assessment for taxes be erroneous in
part, the collector is not personally liable toI an action at the suit of a
party from whom taxes have been levied: St. Louis -Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Charles, 47 Mo.
TITLE.
Recording Deeds-Notice.-A purchaser at an execution sale,
knowing the fact that a third party is in- possession of the land
sold, is put upon inquiry as to the title by which such party holds.
An unrecorded deed is good as between the parties thereto and all
persons having actual notice thereof: Maupin et al. v. Emmons et al.,
47 Mo.
Usuay. See Corporation.
Finding as to Interest.-Where, in an action upon a promissory note,
the single question to be tried is, whether there was a corrupt and
usurious agreement made, upon a loan of money which was the consid-
eration of the note, the interest of the parties is a question of fact; and
that question having been found by the jury against the defendants,
upon conflicting evidence, their finding is conclusive; unless some error
was committed, on the trial, by the judge in his rulings or charge to
the jury: Horton v. Moot, 60 Barb.
What are Questions of Fact.-Whether the transaction was a con-
trivance on the part of the plaintiff, by which he obtained more than
seven per cent. for the loan or forbearance of money; whether it was a
fraud upon the statute, to cover usury; whether the plaintiff bought the
note of the bank at which it was payable ; or whether the bank acted
as the agent of the plaintiff in committing the fraud ;-are not questions
of law independent of the facts upon which the propositions are based.
And if the jury find, correctly, against the defendants, uipon them, the
court cannot reverse their findings : Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Dtmiqs .for F,'audulent Representations of Vendor.-In an action
by a purchaser of land against the vendor, to recover damages for frau-
dulent representations of the latter, the evidence show".1 that during
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the negotiations the plaintiff informed the defendant that he would not
purchase lands held under a tax title, and that the defendant represented
that he "had good title, and the best kind of title," to the lands in
question; that they had been selected as choice lands, many years
before, by one who had great opportunities of locating choice lands ;
and that such person had conveyed some of them to his brother, and
the latter had conveyed them to the defendant. The falsity of the
representations was clearly proved, and the judge charged the jury that
there was no dispute that the lands were held by the defendant under
tax titles; and that if the defendant made the representations proved,
knowing that the title was a tax title, it would be a fraud. Held, that
the charge was correct; and that a verdict having been rendered for
the plaintiff, in accordance with it, and upon the weight of evidence, a
new trial was improperly granted: Updke v. Abel, 60 Barb.
Vendor's Liability to Return .Purchase-Money, or Give Possession.-
An agreement by parol having been made between the plaintiff and the
defendants, for the sale of a dwelling-house by the latter to the former,
and the possession thereof, the plaintiff paid the purchase-money. A
writing was subsequently executed by the defendants, and delivered,
but it did not contain all the agreement. And. upon the plaintiff ob-
jecting to and returning it, on the ground that it did not provide for
giving him the possession, the defendants virtually admitted the fact by
not denying it, and agreeing to make it all right. .ield, that the de-
fendants having received the plaintiff's money upon an agreement to
give him possession, equity and common justice demanded that they
should make him good by returning the money, or giving possession ac-
cording to the agreement: Hoag v. Owen, 60 Barb.
Held, also, that the jury having found that the writing was not a
conveyance to the plaintiff, he was not bound to reconvey the building
to the defendants before bringing an action to recover back the purchase-
money he had paid. That it was sufficient for him to demand posses-
session, or a return of the purchase-money: Id.
Fraudulent Purchase of Goods-Right of Vendor to rescind-Ad-
mixture of Goods-Loss of Identity.-A. & Co., who were insolvent at
the time; purchased of the plaintiff a quantity of wool, on credit, with a
preconceived design not to pay for it; -and a portion of it having been
delivered, it was immediately put into the mill of the purchasers, and a
part thereof was in process of being manufactured, when A. & Co. made
an assignment of all their personal property in trust for the benefit of
their creditors, and the defendant, claiming- under the assignees, took
possession of the wool at the said mill. The plaintiff, claiming the right
to rescind the sale on the ground of fraud, demanded a return of the
property. Held, that the purchase of the wool, by A. & Co., having
been fraudulent, the delivery of the property to them gave them no
title to it. That the assignment was fraudulent and void as against the
plaintiff. That, the assignees not being bond fide purchasers, their
title was no better than that of their assignors. That the defendant
was not a bona fide purchaser, and could claim no protection a§ such.
That the plaintiff had a right to have the original sale rescinded. That
the wool had not, by the acts of A. & Co. in mixing the same with other.
